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What this paper argues -  author's comments
The following is the text of the Sir Richard Kirby 
Lecture which I gave at the University of Wollongong 
on 16 October 1989, entitled "Industrial Relations in 
1989: is a new province of law and order achievable?".
In it I have argued that a new province of law and 
order is not only achievable, but is indeed taking shape 
under a system of conciliation and arbitration, as 
opposed to an enterprise based system of collective 
bargaining.
Since writing the paper I have read the article by 
McDonald and Rimmer, "Award Restructuring and 
Wages Policy" (GROWTH 37: "Wage Determination in 
Australia". Published by CEDA September 1989). In 
their article the authors use the term, "managed 
decentralism", to describe the shift which has taken 
place in wages policy since 1986.
The authors attribute two broad objectives to 
managed decentralism: "macro-economic wage 
restraint and improved micro economic efficiency 
(mainly higher labour productivity)".
If I had read the McDonald and Rimmer article 
before delivering the Kirby Lecture I would have sought 
the authors' permission to use the term "managed 
decentralism" in my title, because the term captures 
perfectly MTIA's strategy for reforming the labour 
market in the metal and engineering industry.
In fact, my paper specifically addresses the two 
objectives of "managed decentralism"
On the first objective -  micro-economic reform -  
I have argued that:
. . in the past three years in particular, the 
(conciliation and arbitration) system has 
demonstrated a remarkable adaptability in meeting 
the nation's need for wholesale labour market reform 
through a program of award restructuring.
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As far as MTIA is concerned, our whole strategy for 
achieving an internationally competitive industry 
rests upon acceptance, at the enterprise level, of the 
concept of mutuality of interests between management 
and employees in place of conflict. Fostering this 
mutuality of interests has been MTIA's key objective 
since 1986.
MTIA's approach and that adopted by the Industrial 
Relations Commission in its Structural Efficiency 
Principle have been to commence the process of refonn 
at the industry level by removing the institutionalised 
roadblocks represented by an outmoded award 
structure and inadequate training systems, and to put 
into place a new framework which will encourage and 
facilitate change at the enterprise level. As employers 
are now beginning to understand, faced with the task 
of having to introduce a completely new job 
classification structure, the major responsibility for 
implementing the reform program will fall on them. 
MTIA sees that its role, in co-operation with the 
trade unions, is to create the environment in which 
enterprises can reasonably expect to achieve the 
changes they need".
Since I delivered the Lecture in mid-October 1989, 
MTIA has put to the metal trades unions a proposal -  
entirely consistent with the idea of "managed 
decentralism" -  to incorporate a provision in the Metal 
Industry Award to enable employers and employees to 
negotiate "Enterprise Flexibility Agreements" the terms 
of which shall be in substitution for the provisions of 
the Award. The unions are yet to respond to the 
proposal but early signs are encouraging for further 
progress in this micro-economic reform.
The second objective of managed decentralism is, 
as I have pointed out, macro-economic wage restraint.
II
My paper draws attention to the fact that ", . . labour 
costs have been contained to a remarkable degree in the 
face of strong demand for labour which saw 380,000 
jobs created in the last year". The point is made that 
there has been a substantial redistribution of national 
income from wages to profits, helping to fund a 
sustained surge in business investment.
It is crucial that wage restraint be maintained.
As I argue in the paper:
"We have had to find a wages system which offers a 
balanced approach to the competing needs of 
considering the macro-wages outcome and the need to 
maintain the momentum of labour market reform over 
the next two to three critical years.
I believe we need to retain a centralised approach to set 
a ceiling on wage increases, but to provide the 
opportunity to industries or enterprises to negotiate 
wage increases to the maximum amount available 
with the objective of improving the productivity and 
efficiency of the enterprise. I think the emphasis, 
however, should be on the enterprise. More likely 
there could be room for a combination of both."
Deregulation of the labour market is perhaps the 
most prominent issue on the economic agenda at 
present and there is unquestionably a need for 
business to understand the implications of the various 
options being proposed. This is not an easy task, given 
the range of views being put forward on a daily basis by 
economic commentators, editorial writers, politicians, 
employer spokesmen, trade union leaders, and others. 
The paper is offered as a contribution to the public 
debate.
A C Evans, Sydney 17 November 1989.
Ill
Text of the lecture
Given the subject matter and the distinguished 
Australian whom this lecture honours, it is fitting that 
I should commence with a statement by Sir Richard 
Kirby written 25 years ago in his capacity as President 
of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration
"Australians have long prided themselves 
on the value of the arbitration system with 
the disciplines it imposes, particularly that 
imposed by the requirement that the parties 
put their cases to the test of open argument 
in public hearing. This has been a striking 
contrast which our system presents, to the 
method of collective bargaining practised 
overseas. It would be a sorry concept of 'a 
new province of law and order' if now the 
handling of problems . . . were to lead to the 
chaos of the jungle. The issue goes beyond 
the interest of one side or other seeking to get 
the most out of a situation for individual 
advantage -  it goes right to the heart of the 
nation's interest".
IV
The basis of the Australian system
As every student of industrial relations knows, 
it was a predecessor of Sir Richard, His Honour 
Mr Justice Higgins who coined that familiar phrase,
"a new province of law and order" to describe the 
industrial relations system of conciliation and 
arbitration then being inaugurated. Justice Higgins 
summed up the objective of the new system in these 
words:
"The process of conciliation, with arbitration in the 
background, is substituted for the rude and barbarous 
process of strike and lock-out. Reason is to displace 
force; the might of the State is to enforce peace 
between industrial combatants, as well as between 
other combatants; and all in the interests of the 
public".
The system in operation
If we are to imply from Justice Higgins, remarks 
that strikes were to be eliminated, then it has to be said 
that the new province of law and order has been 
seldom, if ever, achieved. The fact is that Australia has 
had strikes by unions to a greater or a lesser extent, in 
practically every year since that much quoted phrase 
was first used.
This is despite numerous legislative changes to the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act (now the Industrial 
Relations Act) designed to make the system more 
effective.
What the record has shown is that you cannot 
legislate to prevent entirely all the emotional, social and 
economic factors which lie behind industrial 
disputation, from erupting.
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But they are much less likely to erupt if the nation's 
industrial culture has been developed to full, positive 
maturity.
No one appreciated this more than His Honour Sir 
Richard Kirby who said in his annual report of 1971:
"I feel it my duty to report my strong opinion, based 
on my experience as a Judge of the old Court and as 
President of this Commission for its first 15 years, 
that in the long term a reduction in strikes can only 
be brought about by an improvement in industrial 
relationships, and that this is far more likely to arise 
from changed attitudes of the organised employers on 
the one hand and the organised trade union 
movement on the other hand than from mere changes 
in Acts of parliament. . .".
The two statements by Sir Richard Kirby that I have 
quoted form the basis of my lecture. What I shall argue 
is that a new province of law and order is achievable, 
indeed has been achieved under a system of 
conciliation and arbitration as opposed to a system of 
collective bargaining, and that the single most 
important factor in bringing this about in Australia's 
largest manufacturing sector -  the metal and 
engineering industry -  has been the "changed attitudes 
of organised employers and the organised trade union 
movement".
The confrontation years
We do well, when we wish to assess the present 
and the future, to look at the past. Certainly in the 
metal and engineering industry, industrial behaviour 
during the Sixties and early Seventies fully warranted 
the concern which His Honour expressed.
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In 1963, for example, MTIA or MTEA as it then was, 
handled the greatest number of strikes and disputes 
(209) in its 90-year history, clear evidence that the "rude 
and barbarous process" of strikes had not been 
displaced. There were:
□  strikes to force re-employment of retrenched 
employees;
□  strikes for wage increases;
□  strikes to force weekly hiring of casuals; besides a 
host of demarcation disputes, overtime bans and 
other industrial problems.
The pattern from year to year was broadly the 
same, with unions achieving wage increases by 
arbitration before the Commission and then using 
direct action in individual factories to force overaward 
payments which inevitably flowed across the whole 
industry.
These strikes entailed the loss of 30 or 40 thousand 
man-days for the metal industry in any one year in 
New South Wales alone. They persisted despite a bans 
clause in the award and access by employers to penal 
sanctions.
A noticeable feature, as one goes back to records of 
the mid-Sixties, was the number of strikes which 
occurred either immediately before or during National 
Wage Cases. These strikes were not as a result of 
specific grievances, but were part of concerted union 
campaigns in an attempt to pressurise the Commission 
into meeting the unions' demands. The campaigns 
continued, even though the Commission repeatedly 
stated it was not swayed by them. The campaigns were 
clear manifestations that many trade unions were not 
prepared to accept the proper processes of obtaining 
wage increases.
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And while they may not have influenced the 
Commission's decisions, they did have the effect of 
gaining publicity for the unions among their 
constituents and building up an expectation for 
increases to be gained either within the system or 
outside it.
Confrontation becomes entrenched
During this period, MTIA was constantly reiterating 
the need for arbitration authorities to put beyond 
question any suggestion that claims backed by strikes 
could be sanctioned within the system.
One MTIA annual report (1967) pointed out that
" . . .  too often encouragement is given to such a dual 
system and too infrequently is it made clear that the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act has as a chief object 
the avoidance of disputes and strikes".
In 1967-68, in the NSW metal industry, there were 
324 strikes following the Work Value decision as well as 
another 247 other strikes which could be described as 
the normal yearly quota.
The way in which the "score" of strikes was 
highlighted each year in MTIA reports is itself a 
revealing commentary on how the strike mentality and 
the determination to combat it had become entrenched 
in the industrial culture of those times:
"During the year (1969) MTEA handled a total of 
368 strikes and disputes in New South Wales on 
behalf of its members . . . this is the greatest number 
handled by the Association in any one year (excluding 
the 1967-68 Work Value strikes)".
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Thus, year after year a culture of adversarial 
hostility developed, a far cry indeed from the "new 
province of law and order" espoused so eloquently by 
Higgins J so many years before.
The more buoyant the economy, with high 
employment, full order books and shortages of skilled 
workers, the more the unions bypassed the system to 
achieve their aims by attacking employers on a factory 
by factory basis. Thus the industrial stability in the 
metal industry which we are experiencing in 1989 flies 
in the face of history, and I shall have more to say about 
that later.
Glimmerings of reason
In the long journey towards a new province of law 
and order, there have been attempts to find a smoother 
road. For example, in 1971 MTIA made a conscious 
decision to open a dialogue with the metal trades 
unions and explore the possibility of avoiding the 
disruption which had become endemic in the industry.
Metal industry employers were anxious to deal with 
the claims on an orderly basis at a national level 
through the processes of conciliation and arbitration 
rather than accompanied by strike action. Our other 
objectives at that time were:
□  to ensure that any increases in the general level of 
wages in the industry resulted from award changes 
rather than by individual employers being obliged to 
make concessions under duress and thereby 
widening the gap between award wages and actual 
wages;
□  to take all possible steps to ensure that the industrial 
chaos which occurred in the metal industry
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following the Work Value Case in 1967 did not occur 
again;
□  to strengthen the role of the Conciliation and 
Arbitration system in industrial relations and 
thereby discount claims that it is ineffective and 
should be replaced by a system of collective 
bargaining;
□  to establish sound personal relationships with 
union officials so that employer and union 
representatives could work together to improve 
industrial relations in the industry.
The result was that claims made by the metal trades 
unions in 1971 were settled peaceably before 
Mr Commissioner Hood through a "collective 
conciliation" process instead of being fought out in the 
factories. Parts of the final outcome which related to 
changes in conditions of employment were 
substantially agreed upon by the partie's; other matters 
relating to wages were arbitrated expeditiously.
But because many people had forgotten that the Act 
which governed industrial relations gave the parties 
access to conciliation as well as to arbitration, there was 
a public controversy over the outcome. We were 
accused of undermining the system by entering into 
collective bargaining arrangements. This was, of course, 
far from the truth.
What both parties were coming to realise, after 
many years of confrontation, was that fighting 
industrial issues by direct action did not provide for 
orderly relationships between management and 
employees. Confrontation resulted in lost production, 
lost wages, inflationary wage settlements made beyond 
economic capacity and poor workshop relationships.
On the other hand, best results were not achieved if 
every industrial issue was immediately referred to
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formal arbitration by a third party. Some decisions 
flowing from this procedure had proved to be 
calamitous for industrial relations in the metal trades 
industry -  the 1967 Metal Trades Work Value decision 
was an example.
The development of conciliation
MTIA decided to tread a new path between these 
two extremes, the overall objective being to ensure that 
the claims made for improved wages and conditions in 
the industry were dealt with orderly and uniformly 
throughout the industry, but still within the framework 
of the conciliation and arbitration system.
The emphasis had swung to a fundamental part of 
the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Act 
which read:
". . . the chief objects of this Act are (a) to promote 
goodwill in industry, (b) to encourage conciliation 
with a view to amicable agreement, thereby 
preventing and settling industrial disputes . .
Previously the metal industry had become 
universally acknowledged as the industry where great 
industrial issues were fought out by direct action.
Industrial relations suffered severely from the "hard 
line" approach of both sides, who knew that one small 
gain would soon be reflected throughout the entire 
Australian workforce. In other words, the conciliation 
processes of the Act were not being availed of in the 
metal industry, although conciliation hadlong been a 
common practice in several other important industries 
over many years.
Following the success of the Hood conciliation, 
claims made by the metal trades unions in May 1972 
were therefore dealt with rather differently from the
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past, and from the beginning all avenues available 
under the Act were fully explored.
The unions' claims, which previously would have 
become a national strike issue, were discussed within 
the official conciliation and arbitration system. Instead 
of issues being fought factory by factory with shop 
stewards versus management, professional officers of 
MTIA and the unions hammered out the fundamental 
claims, aided by orderly procedures under the 
jurisdiction of a Deputy President of the Commission, 
Mr Justice Williams.
During these procedures the unions used their best 
endeavours to ensure that work continued, thus 
avoiding wide scale stoppages which usually occurred 
when union claims were at issue.
The achievement of stability in wage levels and 
employment conditions for a defined period had been 
an important consideration during the proceedings. 
Twelve months' stability was achieved after the Hood 
award and continued after the 1972 decision.
Common goals defined
An encouraging development at that time -  
unprecedented, in fact -  was the defining by MTIA and 
the unions of common goals, namely:
"that in the interest of preserving and developing the 
Australian metal trades industry the parties should 
use their best endeavours to ensure that adequate 
recognition is given to the fact that the industry is 
Australia's largest manufacturing industry, that it 
provides employment of many thousands of 
Australian men and women; and, that for their part 
the Unions and employers will continue to co-operate 
in ensuring that the industry remains efficient and a 
vital part of the national economy".
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While stability reigned in the metal industry at this 
time, other industries experienced the full impact of 
confrontation by other unions: power supplies were cut 
in NSW, airports had to close, mail was tied up, trains 
were stopped, and building projects had to be 
abandoned.
Meanwhile, in the metal industry company 
executives were sitting down with union officials and 
shop stewards from across the industry at various 
seminars to hear other points of view, and to make 
their own contributions from the floor.
As I have said, these developments were 
encouraging but were not sufficient to overcome the 
pressures brought about by a buoyant economy and 
high inflation. In the boom period of 1974 the metal 
trades unions were actively pursuing three alternative 
methods of gaining increases, namely the industry 
review, national wage claims and overaward claims on 
individual employers. Thus, a three tiered wage system 
was in operation. Seven days of national stoppages 
occurred during industry negotiations in that year.
When in 1975 the Commission in its National Wage 
decision introduced wage indexation, MTIA saw the 
decision as a highly significant and constructive 
attempt to halt the inflationary spiral by allowing wage 
increases only within the ambit of the conditions laid 
down. MTIA members saw wage indexation as holding 
out some hope -  a forlorn hope, as it eventually turned 
out -  of achieving stability and predictability in relation 
to their escalating wage costs, and certainly preferable 
to the industrial turmoil which had become the norm. 
When wage indexation was abandoned by the 
Commission because of lack of support from the 
parties, history repeated itself with a return to factory
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by factory chaos, culminating in the damaging 35-hour 
week campaign in 1980-81.
Summing up the events of this whole period, 
it must be said that despite sporadic headway made 
during the Seventies, we still had a long way to go 
before we could build upon the mutuality of interests 
which exists between management and the workforce.
Towards a productive industrial culture
In this regard, I should explain more fully what we 
were trying to achieve in our endeavours to open up a 
dialogue with the unions.
We are indebted to another farsighted Australian, 
Senator John Button, for a definition of the kind of 
"industrial culture" earlier foreshadowed by 
Sir Richard Kirby.
Senator Button described industrial culture as 
"the unofficial, unwritten background against which 
decisions are made, and which, to a large extent, 
determines the decisions you can effectively make".
The important words are "decisions you can 
effectively make".
If the industrial culture is not conducive to a 
decision which has been made, whether it is one made 
by government, an industrial tribunal or a company, 
then the chance of it achieving community acceptance 
and of putting it into effect will not be very good.
A positive industrial culture is one in which 
employees and unions are at least reasonably satisfied 
with their working conditions, employers are able to 
operate profitably, and both are aware of the mutuality 
of interests which binds them.
A negative industrial culture is one marked by a 
dissatisfied and belligerent workforce and by employers
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who are more interested in exploiting workers for short 
term gain rather than in a longer term, mutually 
rewarding relationship.
It seems to me that an industrial culture consists of 
two main elements. One is concerned with attitudes:
□  the way people think about work, its satisfactions, 
and its rewards;
□  how they view the employer-employee relationship 
-  whether with hostility, with affability, or 
somewhere in between;
□  what they perceive the role of business to be -  as 
exploiters or as partners in community wealth 
creation;
□  how they see the role of trade unions -  as bully boys 
or responsible representatives of workers with a 
legitimate role;
□  how they see Australia fitting into the rest of the 
world -  appreciating that world developments 
intimately affect our national economy, or 
alternatively, adopting an isolationist, head-in-the- 
sand attitude.
These factors are involved in the first element of 
industrial culture -  that which deals with attitudes.
Alternative industrial structures
The second element is not attitudinal, but 
structural. It is the organisational and procedural 
framework within which attitudes have been allowed 
to develop, and which provides the mechanism for 
dealing with issues that have to be resolved.
At one extreme, this framework may be a 
deregulated collective bargaining system:
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□  in which the parties pit their strengths against each 
other -  we have witnessed this in the domestic 
pilots' dispute;
□  a bargaining system in which the market is the final 
arbiter;
□  with no account being taken of the public interest.
This is one of the possible outcomes so clearly 
described by Sir Richard Kirby 25 years ago, which I 
quoted at the beginning of my paper.
At the other end of the scale of possibilities is a 
rigid, compulsory arbitration system:
□  with no responsibility on the parties to work out 
solutions;
□  one in which industrial issues are decided arbitrarily 
by a third party.
We know now that the ideal system must be 
somewhere between one of complete deregulation and 
rigid control. But in our search for a new province of 
law and order, should it lie more within the framework 
of a collective bargaining system or a system of 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration? I will deal 
with that question now.
Collective bargaining and 
compulsory conciliation and arbitration -  
the fundamental difference
There are those who argue that the system of 
conciliation and arbitration is not serving Australia well 
and that its abandonment should be a national priority. 
Then there are those who, while they believe 
conciliation and arbitration has outlived its usefulness, 
take a more pragmatic view and favour a gradual 
dismantling of the system in favour of a collective
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bargaining system which focuses on the enterprise. In 
other words, the responsibility for setting wage levels, 
conditions of employment and managing labour 
relations would devolve entirely to the enterprise.
An enterprise based system of collective bargaining 
is fundamentally different from a compulsory 
conciliation and arbitration system as we know it, and it 
is important to state this fundamental difference at the 
outset. The Australian conciliation and arbitration 
system is based on the public interest being paramount 
as, you will recall, Sir Richard Kirby reminded us from 
time to time; but in collective bargaining systems, 
where no agreement or contract is in operation 
between the parties, there exists the legal and moral 
right to strike or lock-out, without any consideration of 
the public interest.
This means that when a government and a society 
accepts collective bargaining, they also accept that 
serious and very long strikes and lock-outs, highly 
disruptive at times to the economy of the country, may 
occur without access to any outside body to terminate 
the strike or lock-out. Shortly stated, collective 
bargaining is a free and voluntary process by which 
employers and employees in many countries negotiate 
between themselves to establish terms and conditions 
of employment suitable to that enterprise or industry 
without any regard to the effects it may have on the 
national economy, and hence on the public interest.
The advantage in such a system is that both parties, 
realising this, are required to face up to the issues 
squarely and accept the responsibility for achieving the 
objective which serves their own interests.
Conciliation, on the other hand, is a process by 
which employers and employees in Australia negotiate 
between themselves in an endeavour to establish terms 
and conditions of employment which will be ratified by
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tribunals unless opposed to the public interest.
The founders of the Australian system provided for 
independent tribunals to determine what is right and 
fair between the parties, a procedure supported by laws 
to prevent the occurrence of long strikes (or lock-outs) 
in breach of an award -  a procedure backed up at that 
time by effective laws; it is a matter of regret that 
effective sanctions no longer exist within the industrial 
relations system. It is imperative that this be redressed.
In the event that no agreement is reached, both 
parties are required by law to submit to compulsory 
arbitration and to observe the decision which is based 
on the public interest being paramount, the 
Commission being required by law to have regard to 
the economic consequences of its decision.
Collective bargaining in operation
Now, it has to be said as a matter of historical fact 
that during the period of the Sixties, Seventies and 
early Eighties, in the absence of effective sanctions and 
lack of commitment by the parties, the operation of the 
conciliation and arbitration system left much to be 
desired.
On the other hand, we have to ask ourselves 
whether under a system of collective bargaining this 
earlier turbulent period would have been any different.
Frankly, I think not, because the irony is that the 
period 1968-1982, except for the operation of centralised 
wage fixing, reflected more of a collective bargaining 
system than a system of compulsory conciliation and 
arbitration.
As I have already argued, one of the central tenets 
of a system of collective bargaining is acceptance of the 
legal and moral right to strike. This has been recognised
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in the Niland Green Paper, "Transforming Industrial 
Relations in New South Wales", which recommends 
that the industrial relations system be radically changed 
by encouraging enterprise based collective bargaining, 
with strike action being legitimate during the 
bargaining process.
In the Sixties, Seventies and early Eighties, while 
strike action was not "legitimate", unions nevertheless 
struck with impunity. In damaging factory by factory 
disputation, wages and conditions settlement of a 
diverse nature were demanded of employers. Different 
settlements at various enterprises created anomalies 
and inequities in the minds of employees. Employees 
in a particular factory would become discontented 
when they learned of more favourable wages and 
conditions of employment being granted in other 
workplaces nearby. This discontent, exploited by the 
unions, caused further disputation.
A classic example of collective bargaining, causing 
dissatisfaction, further disputation and a costly 
outcome for Australia occurred in 1970 in the oil 
industry and the ACI Engineering Company.
During the bargaining process the oil companies 
offered four weeks annual leave. In the same time­
frame during bargaining over a new agreement, the 
ACI Engineering Company conceded a 17V2% loading 
on three weeks annual leave.
Employers across the country were individually and 
collectively pursued by the unions to grant to 
employees both of these highly costly conditions of 
employment.
As you are no doubt aware, the four weeks annual 
leave and the 17V2% annual leave loading ultimately 
flowed on to all employees in Australia.
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It has to be said that these concessions occurred as 
a result of consent agreements and not as a result of 
arbitrated decisions of industrial tribunals. Indeed, 
when the metal industry as a whole was presented 
with these demands, we found ourselves surrounded 
by concessions in other industries, so that there was no 
other course reasonably and sensibly open to us but to 
agree to vary the award by consent.
Before this occurred MTIA members had, through a 
series of secret ballots, expressed the view that they 
were not prepared to shut down their factories over 
claims which had been widely conceded and which 
had virtually become national standards.
Support for introducing collective 
bargaining at the enterprise level
The lessons of the past are not always applied to 
determine the future.
As I have already indicated, there is a body of 
opinion that the current system of regulating industrial 
relations in Australia should be replaced by a 
deregulated enterprise based system of bargaining 
directly between employers and employees. This 
opinion has increasingly manifested itself in the form of 
policy statements, Green Papers and, indeed, 
legislative form in Queensland.
The impetus given to the debate over what type of 
industrial relations system would best serve Australian 
future needs is probably a by-product of the wider 
economic debate. Undoubtedly though, it has been 
thrown into sharper focus by the operation of the 
centralised wage fixing system which is an integral 
feature of the formal system of conciliation and
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arbitration -  indeed, in the context of the current 
debate, synonymous with it.
It is both necessary and useful to consider some of 
the policies supporting a deregulated approach.
The Liberal Party's industrial relations policy 
focuses squarely on the enterprise and productivity 
related wage rises.
In Queensland, the Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Act provides for Voluntary Employment 
Agreements (VEA). The basic thrust of VEAs is to 
encourage enterprise-based agreements which, subject 
to meeting certain minimum standards, enables an 
employer and employees to negotiate wages and 
working conditions outside the formal system of 
conciliation and arbitration. I understand, though, that 
the incidence of VEAs is not high.
In New South Wales the State Government has in 
general terms embraced the recommendations of the 
Niland Green Paper I referred to earlier. It is expected 
that many of the Niland recommendations will pass 
into law later this year, including those initiatives aimed 
at encouraging a shift in the focus of industrial relations 
activity to the enterprise. For example, the Green paper 
recommends that:
1. Procedures be established for the formation and 
recognition of enterprise focused bargaining units 
and for the development of enterprise focused 
awards and agreements;
2. The option of establishing an enterprise-wide trade 
union where more than 200 employees vote for such 
a proposal;
3. The rationalisation of existing trade union structures 
which facilitate the formation of enterprise focused 
and/or industry based unions.
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As mentioned earlier, the Green Paper also 
recommends the introduction of the concept of 
distinguishing between interest disputes and rights 
disputes. The former relate to the making of terms of 
employment, the latter relate to the interpretation of the 
rights of the parties to an agreement. This entails 
accepting the legitimacy of the right to strike in respect 
of interest disputes (that is, where there is no 
agreement between the parties or the agreement has 
expired) but casting strikes in respect of rights as 
unlawful and therefore open to action by affected 
parties (that is, where one side or the other breaches 
the terms of the agreement).*
The Green Paper makes this clear when it says 
(p66):
"As discussed elsewhere (Sections 2.8 and 2.9), 
strikes (and bans) as a general rule should be accepted 
as legitimate and lawful in the first phase, but they 
would not be legitimate in the second phase".
Indeed, as we have seen, this is a fundamental 
aspect of a free collective bargaining system, namely the 
legal and moral right to strike and lockout where no 
contract is in existence between the parties.
I simply pose the question: how many employers 
will want to embrace enterprise bargaining on this 
basis?
In the federal arena of labour relations, the 
Industrial Relations Act, 1988 which commenced to 
operate in March this year makes provision for the 
certification of agreements under Section 115.
This section of the Act sanctions decentralised 
bargaining to the extent that:
1. An agreement must be in the public interest but it 
will not necessarily be contrary to the public interest
*The NSW Govt, has since announced it does not intend to embrace this aspect.
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merely because it is inconsistent with National Wage 
Case wage fixing principles;
1. An agreement automatically lapses when its term of 
operation expires;
3. An agreement will not be able to be varied during 
its life except in special and compelling 
circumstances;
4. In the event of industrial action a party may be 
permitted to treat the agreement as terminated.
However, it is important to note that in its May 1989 
decision, a Full Bench in the National Wage Case ruled 
that before certifying an agreement pursuant to S. 115 
the Commission must be satisfied that the agreement is 
not a device to circumvent the general wage fixation 
principles and thus threaten the orderly operation of 
the industrial relations system. S. 115 and the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission's approach to it 
signals a far more cautious approach to enterprise 
bargaining than in the case with VEAs or the New 
South Wales Green Paper.
Viability of a deregulated system 
of enterprise by enterprise 
collective bargaining
Having canvassed the heightened interest in a 
deregulated system of enterprise bargaining, I have to 
consider whether in contemporary Australia, it is a 
viable alternative.
There are several key factors which mitigate against 
appropriate outcomes through a factory by factory 
collective bargaining system. The first of these is the 
concept of comparative wage justice, a deeply
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entrenched belief held by the Australian workforce 
which guarantees that new standards of wages and/or 
conditions conceded in one enterprise or one industry 
flow to employees in other industries.
Even though we may fervently wish that this 
entrenched view would disappear, we are dealing with 
industrial reality -  the concept of comparative wage 
justice is the most fundamental reality of industrial life 
and it will not disappear. Under a system of enterprise 
by enterprise bargaining, increases in wages and 
salaries granted in one enterprise or sector quickly flow 
through to other sectors of the economy. This can be 
particularly damaging when sectors of the economy not 
subject to international competitive pressure to hold 
prices down, easily concede to excessive union 
demands.
A second factor linked to the first is the 
comparatively small industrial/services base in 
Australia, a large proportion of it being concentrated 
along the eastern seaboard. This factor, combined with 
the strongly held "comparative wage justice" principle, 
creates a very fast transfer of improved wages and 
conditions of employment in one enterprise or industry 
to all sectors of the economy. In countries like USA 
where collective bargaining operates, the huge 
industrial/services sector spread throughout the 
country make this flow on of improvements far more 
difficult.
The third key factor is the structure and power of 
the trade union movement in Australia, particularly 
among blue collar workers. We have witnessed in the 
metal and engineering and other industries on many, 
many occasions the devastation which a national union 
or unions can cause when they decide to press 
demands on one company.
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An individual enterprise in the bargaining process 
as envisaged by Professor Niland, in the face of strong 
national unions, is in a very weak bargaining position 
in view of the fact that unions would know they were 
legally and morally entitled to go on strike at the time 
of the bargaining process. Such an enterprise, in our 
experience, will sooner or later accede to the demands 
of the unions. If it does otherwise, the individual 
enterprise will lose market share and eventually go out 
of business. A simple illustration is the case where two 
or three market leaders dominate. One is attacked with 
strike action, and the other one or two take the market 
share, which is afterwards not recovered.
In a system based on collective bargaining at the 
enterprise level, with strike action legalised and no 
recourse to the law, the concessions forced on one 
individual enterprise will very quickly flow to other 
enterprises. As indicated earlier, enterprises operating 
in industries not faced with international competition 
and able to pass on concessions to their customers, will 
more quickly concede large wage increases to satisfy 
the demands of the trade union.
Another factor which cannot be dismissed is that a 
great number of companies have long term contracts, 
some as long as 20 years, where cost recovery occurs 
only if legally binding variations are made by the 
Industrial Relations Commission to the Metal Industry 
Award. In these cases, overaward payments or 
enterprise agreements would not qualify for 
recoupment and the companies concerned would face 
massive economic losses. I know of no other country in 
the world where such a rigid system of rise and fall 
clauses exists. Whether this is a good or bad thing is 
not the issue. It is the reality.
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A deregulated system 
and its implications for wage fixing
If the suggestion is that a system of enterprise based 
bargaining should be instituted as the exclusive system 
of wage fixing to take Australia into the next decade, 
then despite its inherent virtues I am not convinced 
that it is a viable, realistic proposition.
As the Australian Commission said in its August 
1989 National Wage decision:
"Ultimately the test is not the pursuit of what is 
perfect in the abstract, but what is the best outcome 
which is workable and sustainable immediately and 
over the medium and longer term".
Does a system based exclusively on enterprise 
bargaining meet this test, you may ask.
You may also ask how the macro economic 
outcomes can be controlled if there are no constraints 
on the settlements as a result of the free bargaining 
process. Indeed, it is inevitable that in many cases 
industrial pressure will be applied to maximise the 
settlements.
A number of other factors have to be considered. 
The first is that wages policy is essentially set in the 
federal arena. The Labor Government, through its 
Prices and Incomes Accord with the ACTU, has a 
dominant influence over wages policy. There is no sign 
that the Government intends to even countenance a 
deregulated wages system which focuses on enterprise 
bargaining.
Secondly, it could be argued that the States could 
bypass federal dominance over wages policy by 
ignoring the established convention of adopting 
National Wage fixing principles and set their own
22
independent wages policy. For example, in Queensland 
VEAs could be the vehicle. The difficulty with this 
proposition is that in Australia we have a federal system 
for regulating industrial relations. Trade union power 
and influence essentially resides in federal unions and 
their peak council, the ACTU. Therefore, any move 
towards an isolationist wages policy would prove 
difficult because an individual enterprise is in a very 
weak bargaining position when confronted by large 
unions whose power base is national and who would 
have learned a few strategic lessons from the SEQEB 
dispute.
Moreover, any attempt to increase the effectiveness 
of penalties and sanctions against the excesses of trade 
unions would prove less than useful if those unions 
were able to retreat into the federal jurisdiction by, for 
example, serving logs of claims on individual 
enterprises for the purpose of bringing them under 
federal awards.
The third factor: it could be argued that with a 
federal election in prospect, a change of government 
would bring with it a change in wages policy. And 
given the Coalition's policy on wages, the focus would 
be on enterprise bargaining. However, as I understand 
it, the Coalition's policy does not necessarily mean 
abandonment of the existing system of conciliation and 
arbitration, involving as it does registered organisations 
of employees and an independent body, namely, the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission, that 
administers the laws relating to industrial relations.
While a Coalition Federal Government might follow 
the Queensland and New South Wales examples of 
setting up a system of enterprise based bargaining in 
competition with the established system of industrial 
regulation, with the objective that in time the former
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will replace the latter as the preferred system, it would 
remain the case for some years that the existing system 
would continue to operate. Furthermore, I expect that 
the ACTU would still be entitled to make national wage 
claims and the Commission would still be entitled to 
hear and determine those claims in an independent 
manner.
In doing so, I would be surprised, given the 
obvious course which the Commission has set in terms 
of a centralised approach to wage fixing, that it would 
do an about face within the next two years and while 
progress was still being made under its Structural 
Efficiency Principle, by adopting a system of enterprise 
bargaining. The Commission has already heard very 
powerful arguments in support of an enterprise 
approach in the last two wage cases and has rejected 
them.
One thing is perfectly clear : those who own and/or 
manage companies in the metal and engineering 
industry have demonstrated time and time again that 
they are not prepared to risk factory by factory 
bargaining with national unions. Throughout the 
Eighties, MTIA members have voted almost 
unanimously, in secret ballots, for industry settlements 
when these options have been put to them. For 
example, in June 1988, having had an extensive briefing 
on the metal unions wage claims, members were asked 
to vote on one of five options. Rather than risk the 
prospect of a wages breakout, the meeting voted 
overwhelmingly in favour of an option which 
authorised MTIA to take all reasonable steps to resolve 
the claims on terms acceptable to the Commonwealth 
Government and the Arbitration Commission.
In February 1989, a similar ballot was held with 
unanimous support for MTIA to resolve the claims on
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an industry basis thereby avoiding a damaging factory 
by factory overaward payment campaign. The options 
put to members in June 1988 and February 1989 are set 
out in the Appendices.
Benefits from centralised system
I now want to consider what has been achieved 
under a system of conciliation and arbitration of which 
centralised wage fixing is currently an integral feature.
Firstly, labour costs have been contained to a 
remarkable degree in the face of strong demand for 
labour which saw 380,000 jobs created in the last year. 
This point was made in the Australian Financial Review 
(Michael Stutchbury 13/9/89), and I quote:
"The bottom line is that Kelty and Keating have kept 
the lid on wage inflation during what has been 
Australia's biggest economic boom since at least the 
early 1970s. Under the Wages Accord, the ACTU has 
deliberately facilitated the biggest redistribution of 
national income from wages to profits for at least a 
generation.
"This fact seems to be conveniently forgotten by those 
who are now squawking for an abandonment of any 
centralised rein on aggregate labour costs. By 
correcting what in the 1970s was seen by these same 
people as the Australian economy's fundamental 
imbalance (the so-called real wage overhang), the 
Accord has underwritten the corporate profit boom 
which in turn is funding the current surge in 
business investment".
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Factor Shares (a) Per cent
Under the two-tier system in 1987-88 and the 
subsequent structural efficiency principle, the 
centralised system has accelerated the contribution that 
parties to awards could make to improve Australia's 
economic performance, by giving priority to labour 
market reform.
It also provided a stable industrial relations 
environment in relation to wage fixing. There would 
undeniably have been a wages breakout in December 
1988 in the metal industry if the structural efficiency 
principle had not determined an agenda for 
discussions in August 1988 relating to award 
restructuring.this with the full support and 
















At that time, in the face of severe labour shortages, 
MTIA advised its members not to increase overaward 
payments for fear that this would snowball and 
develop into a wages free-for-all with serious economic 
consequences.
The trade unions also showed remarkable restraint 
because they knew that if there were a wages explosion 
it would spell the end of any reform program through 
award restructuring.
The critics of centralised wage fixing argue that a 
decentralised approach governed essentially by market 
forces would have achieved a better wages outcome. 
But would it? Certainly not in the metal and 
engineering industry for the reason I have already 
explained and I dare say it would not have in building, 
transport, airlines, and some other key industry 
sectors. This is because you cannot ignore those other 
market forces which, in the absence of the constraints 
imposed by a centralised wage fixing system, would 
have operated to increase substantially the pressure on 
wages, namely, severe labour shortages, high interest 
rates and the cuts in real wages which have occurred 
over the past six years.
Adaptability of the 
conciliation and arbitration system
I believe MTIA's position in the debate over which 
system is to be preferred -  collective bargaining or 
conciliation and arbitration -  can be summed up as 
follows:
The Australian Constitution has provided us with a 
conciliation and arbitration system which has shown
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remarkable flexibility and ability to adapt to changing 
social and economic imperatives, while at the same 
time affording at least some protection to those within 
its jurisdiction and, not least, to the public interest. In 
the turbulent years after World War II, parties to the 
system failed to take advantage of the system's 
potential; failed to broaden its scope, preferring to 
operate within the narrow parameters of arbitration.
But in the past three years in particular, the system has 
demonstrated a remarkable adaptability in meeting the 
nation's need for wholesale labour market reform 
through a program of award restructuring.
As far as MTIA is concerned, our whole strategy for 
achieving an internationally competitive industry rests 
upon acceptance, at the enterprise level, of the concept 
of mutuality of interests between management and 
employees in place of conflict. Fostering this mutuality 
of interests has been MTIA's key objective since 1986.
MTIA's approach and that adopted by the Industrial 
Relations Commission in its Structural Efficiency 
Principle has been to commence the process of reform 
at the industry level by removing the institutionalised 
roadblocks represented by an outmoded award 
structure and inadequate traininq systems, and to put 
into place a new framework which will encourage and 
facilitate change at the enterprise level. As employers 
are now beginning to understand;faced with the task of 
having to introduce a completely new job classification 
structure, the major responsibility for implementing 
the reform program will fall to them. MTIA sees that its 
role, in cooperation with the trade unions, is to create 
the environment in which enterprises can reasonably 
expect to achieve the changes they need.
In our most recent industry negotiations with the 
metal unions, where the wage requirements were set
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by the Industrial Relations Commission, we have 
emphasised the importance of discussions at the plant 
level. In particular, MTIA is pressing the unions to 
agree to award variations which would allow 
management and its employees by agreement to 
change hours of work, meal breaks, annual leave 
breaks etc. In addition, we are seeking agreement on 
relaxation of demarcation lines, new training 
procedures and many other things, all of which must 
be implemented by discussion at the enterprise level. 
We are, therefore, clearly supportive of negotiations at 
the enterprise level designed to increase productivity. 
Indeed, we believe this to be essential. What we are 
opposed to is the introduction of a system that would 
encourage an industrial free-for-all which would have 
no regard for the public interest. Such an industrial 
free-for-all would crucify our companies and in the 
current environment result in a massive wages 
break-out.
It is MTIA's assessment that in the last three years, 
while many of the achievements are not yet highly 
visible, the basic building blocks of labour market 
reform are now being put into final position and we 
expect the benefits will begin to be realised in 1990/91.
This extraordinary degree of change is occurring 
under the existing conciliation and arbitration system 
and within a timeframe which I do not consider would 
be achievable under a fragmented, uncoordinated 
system of collective bargaining.
We have witnessed the parameters of our system of 
conciliation and arbitration being pushed out to an 
unprecedented extent in recent years. But I do not 
believe we have yet reached the boundaries of our 
system's full potential -  the system can no doubt be 
eased out further. But it is an evolutionary, not a
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revolutionary process. Some impatient reformers 
would want us to scrap the system we have and begin 
again. That old cliche, throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater, seems to be the only apt description for this 
approach, because when you scrap our system in 
favour of a laissez-faire approach, you not only free up 
the labour market, you also unleash raw industrial 
power which can then be exercised quite legitimately in 
a free market. You are back to the "rude and barbarous 
process of strike and lock-out", and public interest 
safeguards become just a memory.
A change in attitudes
1 have argued that conciliation and arbitration, 
through the mechanism of centralised wage fixing, has 
proved its remarkable adaptability. And I have touched 
upon the program of labour market reform currently 
underway. I now want to explain how this evolved in 
the metal and engineering industry and in doing so 
highlight the attitudinal change which has been a 
necessary prerequisite for achieving reform.
I mentioned earlier that MTIA members, in secret 
ballots, have voted for industry settlements rather than 
factory by factory settlements.
They also voted, indeed demanded, that MTIA 
change its traditional ways of automatically rejecting 
union claims'and being seen to be adopting negative 
positions. There was a virtually unanimous view that 
MTIA had to adopt positive attitudes -  to be seen to be 
setting the agenda.
In the adversarial system that exists in Australia for 
settling industries disputes, it is easy to take the 
traditional employer role and always refuse to concede 
that there might be a case for employees to receive a 
wage increase.
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It does not require any great intelligence or courage 
to simply direct our advocate at Commission hearings 
to say no. Employers have done that many times in the 
past, and often with very good reason.
But that does not mean that employers must never, 
under any circumstances, say yes; it does not mean that 
we cannot recognise particular circumstances that 
prevail at any given time; that we cannot then look at 
that situation entirely on its merits.
An overwhelming majority of MTIA members have 
taken the view that the cost of a reasonable wage 
increase has to be set against the advantages which will 
accrue from restructuring the Metal Industry Award 
and establishing an up-to-date training and re-training 
system. They look beyond the present and see the 
impact of these changes on the productivity and 
international competitiveness of their industry, with all 
the benefits which will flow on from that across the 
Australian economy.
That change in attitude was an essential 
precondition for creating the kind of productive culture 
advocated in the Seventies by Sir Richard Kirby and 
revived by Senator Button in the Eighties.
In the Sixties, when employers and unions were 
fighting the absorption and the penal clauses issues, 
the relationship between MTIA and the unions was 
one of aloofness and mutual suspicion.
At that time of all-out confrontation, when we did 
have occasion to meet, it was from well entrenched 
positions on both sides -  the unions making inflexible 
demands and employers giving a flat rejection in reply.
To give effect to the expressed desire of our 
members, for MTIA to adopt a pro-active stance, the 
Association in 1986 took an initiative with the metal
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trades unions designed to make the industry more 
internationally competitive.
We produced a document which we called "MTIA 
Proposal For a Compact With The Metal Unions", and 
presented it to them in December of that year.
The Compact took as its starting point a shared 
concern by employers and unions regarding industry's 
viability and future employment prospects.
What the Compact sought to achieve was 
harmonious industrial relations based on the mutuality 
of interests of management and employees in the 
enterprise; the sad fact was, in all those years of 
industrial conflict, we had never had the will to 
persevere -  I'm talking about the whole Australian 
community here as well as the metal industry -  with 
the creation of this kind of industrial relations culture.
The MTIA Compact proposal sought to build upon 
that mutual interests foundation to achieve with the 
unions:
□  an industry and economic environment which 
would encourage investment and profitability;
□  increased disposable income for employees, but 
making rises cost-neutral by means of trade-offs;
□  development of the skills and capacities of 
individual employees, and increased skill levels and 
capacities in the industry as a whole; and overall
□  a much better image for the industry, including a 
reputation for quality products and for reliability at 
home and overseas.
The Compact made a detailed examination of 
16 separate subjects of mutual interest to unions and 
employers.
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By March 1987, after an encouraging union 
response, we were able to refine the Compact so that it 
contained specific and detailed proposals which had 




□  revision of training programs and techniques;
and
□  discussion on such issues as wage levels, union
coverage, absorption etc.
These and similar proposals have since worked 
their way through the union policymaking processes.
Many of the proposals, training and career 
development, for example, which the unions have 
adopted and which form the basis of the present award 
restructuring program, stem from MTIA initiatives in 
1986 when we sat down with union officials to establish 
a bipartisan approach in the area of training and career 
development.
Likewise, a report released by the metal trades 
unions and the ACTU in 1987 followed the closely 
reasoned MTIA Compact proposals on multi-skilling, 
higher trade classifications, wage levels, absorption and 
union coverage.
Another important initiative can be found in our 
submission to the Hancock Committee, set up to 
examine the federal system of industrial regulation.
MTIA proposed that a new object should be added 
to Section 2 of the Conciliation and Arbitration Act, 
requiring the Commission "to pay proper regard to the 
effect its awards may have on the ability of import-
Forerunner to award restructuring
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competing and export-oriented industries to remain 
internationally competitive".
Later, the ACTU in its policy document, "Australia 
Re-constructed" conceded that the wages system 
should "pay due regard to price and productivity 
movements in the internationally traded goods and 
services sector and that "any community standard 
should, as far as possible, be set in this sector".
I refer to these developments, not in order to seek 
credit for my own Association, but merely to show the 
vastly different industrial environment which has 
developed as a result of changed attitudes on the part 
of employers and unions -  changes which Sir Richard 
Kirby referred to in prophetic terms back in 1971.
A genuine response from the employers has 
produced a like response from the unions. This reflects 
great credit on the leadership of the ACTU and the 
metal unions. When one considers the long-held 
antagonisms of many trade unionists towards 
employers and the unaccustomed restraint on the part 
of unionists which the new industrial culture has 
required, the ACTU has demonstrated leadership 
which is highly responsible as well as being 
unprecedented. The new relationship between 
employers and unions must be nurtured and above all, 
not taken for granted, because if circumstances at some 
future time made it desirable for the unions to do so, 
they could still revert to the use of their industrial 
power.
Award restructuring
Without these significant changes in attitudes, 
progress in award restructuring would not have been 
achieved.
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In the process of changing Australia's industrial 
culture, MTIA has been the initiator and at the cutting 
edge of award restructuring.
Award restructuring is a deceptively simple title for 
complex changes which will have far reaching 
consequences in the way workplaces operate, in the 
way people are trained, and in the creation of career 
paths for occupations which have never enjoyed 
planned enhancement of skills and opportunities for 
advancement.
Much more is involved than broadbanding and 
changing the titles of job classifications -  we are seeing 
the beginning of a fundamental change in the way 
work is performed, the objective being greater labour 
flexibility and job satisfaction, higher productivity and 
international competitiveness. Changes like these, 
which amount to the introduction of a new industrial 
culture, require careful planning and gradual 
implementation, and a time scale of between three and 
five years.
Award restructuring has effectively set the scene for 
much greater emphasis to be placed on productivity 
improvements negotiated and implemented at the 
enterprise level. It preserves all the advantages of 
industrial stability which the centralised system can 
deliver, while shifting the industrial relations centre of 
gravity, as it were, closer to the workplace itself. Award 
restructuring has done this by setting out to remove the 
road blocks which had become entrenched and 
institutionalised in the systems over many decades, 
without the removal of which smooth headway could 
not be made: an inflexible, outdated system of labour 
classification gives way to broadbanding and 
multiskilling, allowing employees to perform a wider 
range of tasks; a new training system, conducive to
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career path development being developed in 
conjunction with TAFE, replaces a narrow training 
regimen based on exclusivity and demarcation.
A joint educational approach by the parties to the 
award means that managers, supervisors and shop 
stewards attend courses designed to facilitate, in a 
co-operative environment, implementation of the new 
system and with it opportunities for raising 
productivity in the enterprise.
The ramifications of award restructuring thus go far 
beyond the question of changed work practices. It 
marks another stage in the development of our 
industrial culture, a broadening of our horizons, so that 
we begin to see the big picture: a nation made more 
productive, more economically sound because 
managements and employees in its enterprises have 
the will and the means to achieve their full capabilities.
Towards a better future
I stated earlier that we have made considerable 
progress towards implementing our reform agenda.
Of course, we have had to deal with some significant 
problems as you might expect when the objective is to 
overturn 90 years of an industrial way of life.
Nevertheless, I am optimistic that, with patience 
and commonsense, and relying on the trust and 
confidence which has built up between organised 
employers and organised employees over the past three 
years, we will achieve our ambitious goals.
That brings me to what lies ahead and, in this 
regard, I want to be reasonably selective and address 
two areas that I consider to be critical to our ongoing 
program of reform: 1. Union Structures; 2. The Wages 
System.
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It is axiomatic in my view that if we are to achieve 
greater labour flexibility, including multi-skilling, we 
must rationalise the union structures in our industry.
If current union structures and the accompanying 
demarcation lines continue to operate, then the more 
flexible job classification system we are putting into 
place will simply be a waste of time.
Rationalisation of union structures was high on the 
agenda of the recent Biennial Congress of the ACTU 
and I believe there is sufficient commitment within the 
trade union movement to achieve change. Indeed,
I think most unions accept that in the longer term they 
may not survive unless they can accommodate the 
needs and aspirations of a workforce whose 
composition and attitudes have changed markedly in 
the last 50 years. But it is not only the needs of potential 
members that will have to be met. The needs of 
industry must also be met. Gone are the days when 
enterprises can be expected to operate efficiently and 
profitably with -  taking a real instance -  23 unions 
representing 23 sections of the plant's workforce.
I am also reminded of the problems of multiple 
unions when I look back over the past 12 months of 
negotiating an award restructuring agenda in the metal 
and engineering industry and realise how difficult it 
was. Not because of the differences between MTIA and 
the main union elements but because of the differences 
between the unions themselves.
As I have said, the unions have recognised the need 
for more rational structures. And amalgamation of 
unions is occurring at an increasing rate. For example,
Trade union structures
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next year the Amalgamated Metal Workers Union and 
the Association of Draughting, Supervisory and 
Technical Employees are to merge, as are the Electrical 
Trades Union and the Australasian Society of 
Engineers. I think the Federated Ironworkers 
Association and the Australian Workers Union are still 
intending to amalgamate.
While amalgamation is the primary mechanism for 
achieving rational union structure, there is also Section 
118 of the Industrial Relations Act. This Section 
provides that the Commission may make an order to 
the effect that although a union might not have 
coverage of a group of employees under its Rules, it 
may be given coverage to the exclusion of another 
union who might have that coverage already. The FIA 
has sought to take early advantage of this new 
provision but, as you might expect, the unions who are 
likely to lose as a result of any order under Section 118 
are less than enthusiastic about this device for 
achieving rational union structures.
Now, amalgamations and the use of Section 118 are 
not exactly "fast-track" procedures. And while they are 
vital elements in any successful strategy of labour 
market reform, there are other arrangements we should 
not overlook and which employers can help to initiate.
For example, in setting up new manufacturing 
plants or "greenfield sites" union coverage can be 
limited to 2 or 3 unions and, in some cases, to single 
union coverage.
Secondly, as an interim measure, it is open to the 
unions to meet among themselves and agree on a code 
to be adopted where, in the interests of labour 
flexibility, members of one union are able to perform 
the work traditionally performed by other unions.
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The metal unions have already committed themselves 
to this process.
Thirdly, depending on what develops at the 
industry level, I think it is open to employers and 
unions within an enterprise to come to their own 
arrangements to avoid demarcation problems.
The main responsibility for achieving change in this 
area lies with the unions themselves, principally 
through amalgamations.
But there are opportunities to make immediate 
changes by agreement between employers and unions 
at the industry and enterprise level. We simply cannot 
wait for amalgamations to solve a problem which will 
arise tomorrow because the forklift driven by an 
ironworker is not allowed to cross the yellow line into 
the stores area or because the mechanical fitter cannot 
change an electric light globe.
Future wages policy
While award restructuring will take the next three to 
five years to implement, this does not mean that there 
will be no further wage increases for that period. Any 
person or organisation which relies on such a strategy 
will be irrelevant in any future debate over wages 
policy.
Already, the Australian Council of Trade Unions 
(ACTU) has signalled that in May 1990 it will lodge 
claims for cost of living adjustments to operate from 
September 1990.
Accordingly, employers and their representative 
organisations need to be considering now what their 
position will be regarding wage policy next year and in 
the years immediately following.
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Viable options
The serious and deepseated nature of our economic 
problems should rule out the possibility of the 
prevailing system of wage fixation being discarded, 
at least in the short term.
Assuming it is retained, it must provide for an 
orderly process and which produces a macro-wages 
outcome which is economically sustainable.
In this context, cost of living adjustments are 
unsustainable.
A highly centralised system of that type which 
operated between 1983 and 1986 and which focused 
almost exclusively on cost of living adjustments 
delivered through the mechanism of National Wage 
Cases is, in my view, not a system which is appropriate 
for Australia in the early 1990s. That view is not shared 
by the ACTU, which proposes that wages should be 
adjusted for prices in 1990. The ACTU may well have 
decided that, with the second tier exercise in 1987 and 
the structural efficiency principles in 1988 and 1989, the 
union movement has taken restructuring as far as its 
constituents will bear at this time: perhaps the unions 
feel they need a break from the hard grind of 
negotiating restructuring agreements in return for wage 
increases.
The fact of the matter is, however, that "manna 
from heaven" wage increases granted without 
productivity off-sets are a luxury the Australian 
economy can no longer afford.
Given the progress we have made over the past 
three years towards a more productivity related wages 
system, to revert to wage/prices adjustments is not a 
viable option for this country.
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The Industrial Relations Commission said in its 
August 1989 National Wage decision:
"There is no doubt that labour market reform and in 
particular, award wage restraint, have over recent 
years contributed positively to the rapid growth in 
many sectors of the economy.
". . . it is also apparent that continued efficiencies and 
improvements in labour flexibility as well as ongoing 
wage restraint will remain necessary".
We have to find a wages system which offers a 
balanced approach to the competing needs of 
controlling the macro-wages outcome and the need to 
maintain the momentum of labour market reform over 
the next two to three critical years.
I believe we need to retain the centralised approach 
to set a ceiling on wage increases but provide the 
opportunity to industries or enterprises to negotiate 
wage increases to the maximum amount available with 
the objective of improving the productivity and 
efficiency of the industry or enterprise. I think the 
emphasis, however, should be on the enterprise. More 
than likely there could be room for a combination 
of both.
There will be those in the union movement in 
particular who throw up their hands in horror at this 
approach because it will remind them of the 1987 two 
tier approach to wage fixing. The two tier approach 
relied too heavily on a narrow agenda largely directed 
at removing restrictive work practices and has been 
criticised for its negative, cost-cutting approach.
We have to be far more innovative next time around 
and perhaps there are some lessons to be learned from 
other countries in this regard. But in no circumstances
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can Australia afford to revert to cost of living wage 
adjustments.
Wages conference proposal
As we look towards the next stage in the evolution 
of industrial relations, employers need to begin now to 
stake out their wage policy positions.
In the past, employers have allowed the ACTU to 
build up expectations about a wages outcome months 
in advance of it being considered by the Industrial 
Relations Commission, and as a result it becomes self- 
fulfilling. Once again, we see the ACTU creating early 
expectations, attempting to set the agenda, by 
signalling that its wages policy in 1990 will be based on 
cost of living movements. It is therefore critical that 
employers begin the process of formulating a realistic, 
innovative wage policy which attracts widespread 
public support.
But this will not be enough. The traditional 
approach to fixing national wages has been that the 
ACTU files a claim for a wage increase on behalf of its 
affiliates and the adversarial process of long-winded, 
often irrelevant debate begins. Parties are locked into 
advocating a particular policy from day one with little 
opportunity for sensible compromise or negotiation 
later in the proceedings.
If as employers we are serious in wanting a more 
flexible wages policy, which will maintain the 
momentum of labour market reform, then we cannot 
afford to leave matters until the commencement of the 
next National Wage Case, by which time the agenda 
will essentially have been determined. What we need is 
a Wages Conference well before May next year to 
enable an exchange of views on wages policy and,
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hopefully, reach some consensus on such a policy. The 
Conference would necessarily involve the Australian 
Industrial Relations Commission, the Commonwealth 
Government, State Governments, major employer 
bodies, the ACTU, and representatives from State 
industrial tribunals. Employers must be prepared to be 
more honest, and lay their cards on the table. The 
extent to which employer organisations are able to meet 
this challenge will be a mark of their maturity or 
otherwise.
Over the next few months, in addition to the 
massive task of implementing award restructuring, 
MTIA will be considering its own policy on wages in 
the light of: progress in award restructuring; the 
ongoing cost impact over the next two years arising out 
of the last National Wage Case decision; economic 
forecasts; and our members' expectations of future 
business conditions. An assessment of these factors 
may demand that any potential wage increases over the 
next two years be substantially discounted. But in the 
course of our deliberations we will be looking at how 
we can make a positive and constructive contribution to 
national wage policy.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the short answer to the proposition 
posed in the title of my paper is: yes, Australia has 
demonstrated in 1989 that it is capable of making great 
progress in adapting industrial relations attitudes and 
institutions to meet the over-riding public interest -  in 
this case the need to overcome the nation's chronic 
economic problems. To that extent, who can say that a 
new province of law and order is not slowly and 
imperceptibly taking shape around us? If that is so -
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and I believe it is -  it owes its development and its 
continued survival to the willingness of those 
concerned:
□  to learn the lessons of history
□  and to apply that knowledge in good conscience 
and in a spirit of fair dealing.
As Australians, we are the custodians as well as the 
beneficiaries of a unique but still imperfect system of 
industrial law and order; it is incumbent upon each 
generation to leave it in better shape than we found it.
As Sir Richard Kirby has said, it " . . goes beyond 
the interest of one side or another seeking to get the 
most out of a situation for individual advantage -  
it goes right to the heart of the nation's interest".
O
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______ Wages and Award Restructuring
Appendix 1 -  ballot paper June 1988
Having heard a report on claims by the metal trades 
unions for wage increases and the background to 
those claims, this meeting:-
1 Confirms that the priority for both employers and 
employees in the metal and engineering industry must be 
the maintenance of the industry's future viability. This will 
depend to a very large extent on there being a quantum 
leap in the industry's productivity and productive culture 
and that MTIA's proposals for an agreement with the 
MTFU on award restructuring, more flexible utilisation of 
labour and the introduction of career paths provides a 
sound basis for achieving this;
|~2~| Emphasises the importance of a moderate wages 
outcome in 1988/89;
: 3  ̂ Notes that in the Economic Statement delivered by 
the Treasurer on 25 May 1988, he said that:
"Our overriding objective m ust also be to keep 
wages growth as close a s  possible to our 
trad in g  p artn ers  so th a t  we rem ain  
competitive on w orld m arkets.
A fter the hard  work an d  sacrifice o f  recent 
years, an d  with inflation now heading  
tow ards 5 p er cent or lower, this objective is 
consistent with the overall m aintenance o f  
real wages in 1988-89."
4̂  N otes fu rth e r  th a t the Com m onw ealth 
Government's policy in the forthcoming National Wage 
Case is that it will be advocating that real wages should be 
maintained in 1988-89 and that any wage increase should 
be introduced in two stages.
Appendix 1  (continued)
Having regard  to the foregoing this 
meeting has formed the view that:-
Q  The National Executive of MTIA 
should authorise a submission to the 
National Wage Case which reiterates the 
Association's existing policy i.e., that the 
package of train ing  and award 
restructuring measures referred to in 
MTIA's proposals for an agreement with 
the MTFU are designed to lift productivity 
at both the industry and enterprise level. 
However, the amount and timing of any 
wage increase justified by this package 
shall be a matter to be determined by the 
Australian Conciliation and Arbitration 
Commission in accordance with any 
principles which may apply following the 
review of the existing wage fixing 
principles.
OR
0  The National Executive of MTIA 
should authorise a positive submission 
which:-
a) em phasises the overriding
importance to the industry of the award 
restructuring exercise which is designed 
to improve the industry's productivity and 
productive culture
b) acknowledges th a t it  is the
Commonwealth Government's objective 
to maintain the level of real v/ages in 1988/ 
89, consistent with an inflation rate of 5 
per cent or lower;
c) maintains the position that the
amount and timing of any wage increase 
justified by the proposed agreement 
between MTIA and the MTFU relating to 
award restructuring, more flexible 
utilisation of labour and training and 
career development should be determined 
in the National Wage Case;
OR
El The National Executive of MTIA 
should authorise a submission in the 
National Wage Case to the effect that the 
package of measures contained in MTIA's 
proposals for an agreement with the 
MTFU on award restructuring, training 
and career paths, together with the 
Commonwealth's support for a wage 
increase, provide grounds for wages to be 
adjusted in two stages in 1988/89 on 
terms to be decided in the National Wage 
Case;
OR
□  The National Executive of MTIA 
should authorise the taking of all steps 
which are reasonably open to MTIA and 
which are achievable, to have the matter 
resolved on terms acceptable to both the 
Commonwealth Government and the 
Arbitration Commission and which are 
consistent with the Commonwealth’s 
wages policy and MTIA's strategy for 
award restructuring, training and career 
development.
OR
0  Any other course of action that 
members consider appropriate.
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Appendix 2 -  ballot paper February 1989
 ■ M T J A ------------------------
Wages and Award Restructuring
Having heard a Full Report on MTIA’s Award Restructuring 
Proposals and having considered the factors influencing wage levels 
and industrial relations in 1989-90, this meeting has formed the 
view th a t:-
1 1 1 The National Executive of MTIA should authorise a sub­
mission to the May 1989 National Wage Case which reiterates the 
Association’s existing policy on wages. This means that there should 
be no general wage increases in the 1989-90 financial year. Any 
wage increases should only become payable once an individual 
employee puts to use the new skills acquired under the restructured 
award. Furthermore, the maximum amounts of any wage increases 
justified under MTIA’s proposals should be determined by the 
National Wage Case.
OR
3 J  The National Executive of MTIA should authorise a sub­
m ission in th e May 1989 N ational Wage Case as follow s: 
Implementation of the package of measures contained in MTIA’s 
restructuring proposals, or implementation of any agreement 
substantially based on those proposals, provide grounds for wages 
to be adjusted across the board in two stages in 1989-90 on terms 
to be decided in the National Wage Case.
OR
3 The National Executive of MTIA should authorise the taking 
of all steps which are reasonably open to MTIA to achieve an 
agreement with the Metal Trades Unions and the ACTU on wages 
and award restru cturing  on term s accep tab le  to both the 
Commonwealt h Government and the Arbitration Commission and 
which are consistent with MTIA’s proposals for award restructuring, 
training and career development.
OR
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